University of Connecticut

OpenCommons@UConn
Connecticut Law Review

School of Law

2022

Connecticut Workers’ Compensation Coverage for Medical
Cannabis in the Age of the Opioid Crisis
Sydnee Sousa

Follow this and additional works at: https://opencommons.uconn.edu/law_review
Part of the Workers' Compensation Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Sousa, Sydnee, "Connecticut Workers’ Compensation Coverage for Medical Cannabis in the Age of the
Opioid Crisis" (2022). Connecticut Law Review. 543.
https://opencommons.uconn.edu/law_review/543

CONNECTICUT

LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 53

FEBRUARY 2022

NUMBER 4

Note
Connecticut Workers’ Compensation Coverage for
Medical Cannabis in the Age of the Opioid Crisis
SYDNEE SOUSA
In 2019 the Connecticut Workers’ Compensation Review Board (CRB) in Caye
v. Thyssenkrupp Elevator rejected the employer and its workers’ compensation
insurer’s argument that the Workers’ Compensation Commission cannot compel
them to reimburse the cost of medical cannabis because such an order would
require them to engage in conduct that is criminalized under the Controlled
Substances Act (CSA). The CRB in Caye instead affirmed the trial commissioner’s
order that the respondent must reimburse the claimant’s expenses in obtaining
medical cannabis.
This Note argues that when the issue of workers’ compensation reimbursement
for medical cannabis is inevitably reviewed by the Connecticut Appellate or
Supreme Court, the reviewing court can and should compel employers and their
insurance carriers to reimburse claimants for the cost of medical cannabis. Despite
the legal haziness the CSA creates, employers and their insurers can avoid
knowingly breaking federal law by reimbursing the cost of cannabis as an
out-of-pocket expense.
In addition to the legal reasoning set forth in this Note, the CT Appellate or
Supreme Court should rule on the side of workers as a matter of public interest. The
opioid epidemic in the United States claimed the lives of nearly 500,000 people from
1999 to 2019. The opioid epidemic is far from over, and, as a result, hundreds of
Connecticut residents’ lives continue to be cut short. Although increasing workers’
compensation coverage for medical cannabis is not a cure-all solution to the
epidemic, increasing access to an effective, less deadly alternative is a step in the
right direction.
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Connecticut Workers’ Compensation Coverage for
Medical Cannabis1 in the Age of the Opioid Crisis
SYDNEE SOUSA*
INTRODUCTION
The opioid epidemic in the United States claimed the lives of nearly
500,000 people from 1999 to 2019.2 Prescription opioid overdoses in
particular claimed the lives of over 247,000 people from 1999 to 2019. 3 “In
Connecticut, residents are more likely to die from unintentional drug
overdose than a motor vehicle accident . . . . [and] [t]he majority of these
deaths are linked to overdose of prescription opioid painkillers and illicit
opioids.”4 Thankfully, prescription opioid misuse is declining,5 and
corporations like Johnson & Johnson and opioid distributors are being held
accountable for their role in this epidemic.6 Still, in the United States, an
*
University of Connecticut, J.D., 2021. Smith College, B.A., 2017. I would like to extend my
thanks to Attorney Joseph Passaretti, for his thoughtful feedback and expertise during my drafting
process. I would also like to thank the entire Connecticut Law Review team for their careful edits. Thank
you to my friends and family for their endless support, especially my Mom for her unwavering
encouragement; my Dad, Attorney Bob Sousa, for his guidance and for providing me the opportunity to
work with injured workers directly, inspiring this Note; and my partner James, for always believing in
me. Finally, I would like to dedicate this Note to my loved ones who have lost their lives to opioid
overdoses; I carry you with me every day.
1
I use the word cannabis, as opposed to the word marijuana, whenever possible throughout this
Note, as the word marijuana has “racist roots.” I make an exception when I directly quote certain material,
for example, many medical cannabis statutes. See Alex Halperin, Marijuana: Is It Time to Stop Using a
Word with Racist Roots?, GUARDIAN (Jan. 29, 2018, 5:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/society/2
018/jan/29/marijuana-name-cannabis-racism (discussing the historical roots of the word marijuana and,
in particular, its racist roots).
2
Opioids: Understanding the Epidemic, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/opioids/basics/epidemic.html (last reviewed Mar. 17, 2021).
3
Drug Overdose: Overview, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov
/drugoverdose/deaths/prescription/overview.html (last reviewed Mar. 17, 2021). In 2020, “[a]s Covid
raged, so did the country’s other epidemic. Drug overdose deaths rose nearly 30 percent in 2020 to a
record 93,000 . . . . It’s the largest single-year increase recorded. . . . Several grim records were set
[including] the most deaths from opioid overdoses.” Josh Katz & Margot Sanger-Katz, ‘It’s Huge,
It’s Historic, It’s Unheard-of’: Drug Overdose Deaths Spike, N.Y. T IMES (July 14, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/07/14/upshot/drug-overdose-deaths.html.
4
Opioids and Prescription Drug Overdose Prevention, CONN. STATE DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH,
https://portal.ct.gov/DPH/Health-Education-Management-Surveillance/The-Office-of-Injury-Preventio
n/Opioids-and-Prescription-Drug-Overdose-Prevention-Program#Data (last visited July 11, 2020).
5
Austin Frakt, Can Marijuana Help Cure the Opioid Crisis?, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/17/upshot/marijuana-opioids-research-connection.html; Opioid
Overdose: Prescribing Practices, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/
drugoverdose/data/prescribing/prescribing-practices.html (last reviewed Aug. 13, 2019); Opioids:
Understanding the Epidemic, supra note 2.
6
See Jan Hoffman, Drug Distributors and J.&J. Reach $26 Billion Deal to End Opioid Lawsuits,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/21/health/opioids-distributors-settleme
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average of thirty-eight people died each day in 2019 from prescription opioid
overdoses, a number that does not account for people who overdosed on
illicit drugs, such as heroin, after transitioning from prescription opioids. 7
In a perfect world, no one would need an opioid prescription, but as
people continue to get seriously injured and have surgeries, the
disappearance of opioid prescriptions are extremely unlikely. However,
given the fact that since 1999, the amount of overdoses and deaths from
prescription opioids has increased in line with the increase of opioids
prescribed, we should make every effective and relatively safe alternative
for pain management accessible.8 Luckily, medical cannabis is an effective
alternative for chronic pain, and medical cannabis use has been associated
with decreased opiate medication use.9 People in Connecticut and
throughout the United States, however, are unable to access medical
cannabis as an alternative for pain relief. Namely, injured workers in
Connecticut cannot easily access medical cannabis because of the conflict
between the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA) and Connecticut’s
Palliative Use of Marijuana Act (PUMA).10
Over five years ago, in Petrini v. Marcus Dairy, Inc, the Connecticut
Compensation Review Board (CRB) affirmed the decision of the trial
commissioner finding that medical cannabis was a reasonable and necessary
medical treatment and was therefore compensable.11 Nonetheless,
employers and their workers’ compensation insurers asserted that there was
still an issue as to whether the Workers’ Compensation Commission could
compel them to reimburse the cost of medical cannabis, and, as a result,
engage in conduct made criminal by the CSA.12 Consequently, the vehicle
to reimburse medical cannabis remained in question, which meant injured
workers in Connecticut still faced obstacles to find alternatives to opioid
prescriptions. Then, on October 29, 2019, in Caye v. Thyssenkrupp Elevator,
the CRB directly took up this outstanding issue, finding “the matter of
nt.html (“[T]he country’s three major drug distributors and a pharmaceutical giant have reached a $26
billion deal with states that would release some of the biggest companies in the industry from all civil
liability in the opioid epidemic . . . . The agreement . . . lays the framework for billions of dollars to begin
flowing into communities across the country for addiction treatment, prevention services and other steep
expenses from the epidemic.”).
7
Drug Overdose: Prescription Opioid Overdose Death Maps, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/deaths/prescription/maps.html (last reviewed Mar. 24,
2021); Opioid Overdose Crisis, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE (May 27, 2020),
https://www.drugabuse.gov/drug-topics/opioids/opioid-overdose-crisis.
8
Drug Overdose: Overview, supra note 3.
9
Kevin F. Boehnke, Evangelos Litinas & Daniel J. Clauw, Medical Cannabis Use Is Associated
with Decreased Opiate Medication Use in a Retrospective Cross-Sectional Survey of Patients with
Chronic Pain, 17 J. PAIN 739, 739 (2016).
10
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2018); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 21a-408–408v (2020).
11
Petrini v. Marcus Dairy, Inc., No. 6021 CRB-7-15-7, 2016 WL 6659149, at *1 (Conn. Workers’
Comp. Comm’n Rev. Div. May 12, 2016).
12
Craig Abbott, Medical Marijuana Update, 29 COMP. Q. 6, 6–7 (2019). Throughout this Note, I
use the word “respondent” to refer to both workers’ compensation employers and their workers’
compensation insurers.
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federal preemption of Connecticut law to be potential and not actual” and
thus affirmed the trial commissioner’s order that the respondent must reimburse
the claimant’s cost associated with his medical cannabis prescription.13
The respondents subsequently withdrew their appeal to the Connecticut
Appellate Court.14 Accordingly, neither the Connecticut (CT) Appellate
Court nor the CT Supreme Court have reviewed a CRB case presenting the
issue in Caye, which is whether “the federal Controlled Substances Act . . .
proscribe[s] a state agency from ordering an insurance carrier to pay or
reimburse for marijuana prescriptions.”15 This Note argues that when this
issue is reviewed by the CT Appellate or Supreme Court, the reviewing court
can and should compel employers and their insurance carriers to reimburse
claimants for the cost of medical cannabis.
This Note proceeds in four parts. Part I discusses the devastating opioid
crisis, in particular opioid prescription misuse, and how medical cannabis is
an available and effective medication to treat chronic pain. Part II analyzes
the relevant federal and state regulations of medical cannabis and how many
state laws conflict with the CSA. Part III addresses how this conflict affects
workers’ compensation coverage of medical cannabis. Part III reviews
PUMA and the CT Workers’ Compensation Act, noting the standard of what
is considered reasonable or necessary treatment.16 Part III then introduces
the Petrini and Caye opinions, including the dissenting opinion in Caye. Part
IV argues the CT Appellate or Supreme Court can and should compel
respondents and their insurance carriers to cover the cost of medical
cannabis prescribed to injured workers. As the CRB found in Caye, Part IV
argues that employers and insurers can avoid knowingly breaking federal
law by reimbursing the cost of the cannabis as an out-of-pocket expense.17
Part IV reasons that CRB cases Petrini and Caye provide the reviewing
court strong footing to rule on the side of workers. Part IV also examines a
CT Superior Court case and a District of Connecticut case, both finding that
the CSA did not preempt PUMA’s anti-discrimination employment
13
Caye v. Thyssenkrupp Elevator, No. 6296 CRB-1-18-11, 2019 WL 6168483, at *1, *11 (Conn.
Workers’ Comp. Comm’n Rev. Div. Oct. 29, 2019).
14
Medical Marijuana Update: Caye v. Thyssenkrupp Elevator, HALLORAN SAGE (Dec. 6, 2019),
http://halloransage.com/news/medical-marijuana-update-caye-v-thyssenkrupp-elevator/.
15
Caye, 2019 WL 6168483, at *1.
16
See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-294d(a)(1) (2019) (describing the employer’s obligation to pay for
reasonable or necessary medication). The statutory standard is “reasonable or necessary,” however, many
trial commissioners describe this statutory requirement as reasonable and necessary, even using both
conjunctions within the same opinion. See, e.g., Petrini, 2016 WL 6659149, at *1, *3 (stating one issue
was “whether the claimant’s use of medical marijuana . . . constitutes reasonable and necessary medical
treatment,” and later stating “[t]he trial commissioner noted that ‘[u]nder our law, reasonable or
necessary medical care is that which is curative or remedial”) (emphasis added). Throughout this Note,
I sometimes describe medical cannabis as “reasonable and necessary” medication in order to emphasize
how medical cannabis is often both, although the treatment need only be reasonable or necessary under
the law. See Lionetti v. Messineo, L.L.C., No. 6207 CRB-7-17-7, 2019 WL 3934753, at *1, *9 (Conn.
Workers’ Comp. Comm’n Rev. Div. June 7, 2019) (holding that, since the proposed operation was
reasonable, it satisfied the requirement of § 31-294d(a)(1)).
17
Caye, 2019 WL 6168483, at *9.

950

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:4

18

provision, and how the reasoning in these decisions might inform
preemption issues in the workers’ compensation context. Lastly, Part IV
observes how other states have approached the issue of compelling workers’
compensation carriers to reimburse medical cannabis and how these
opinions may inform how Connecticut should answer this question.
Accordingly, the CT Appellate Court and Supreme Court has vast legal
support to affirm the CRB’s basic holding that workers’ compensation
carriers should reimburse claimants for the cost of medical cannabis. In
addition to the legal reasoning set forth in this Note, the CT Appellate or
Supreme Court should rule on the side of workers as a matter of public
interest. Right now, the opioid epidemic is far from over, and, as a result,
hundreds of Connecticut residents’ lives continue to be cut short.19 Although
increasing workers’ compensation coverage for medical cannabis is not a
cure-all solution to the epidemic, increasing access to an effective, less
deadly alternative is a step in the right direction.
I. THE OPIOID CRISIS AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
Millions of Americans are prescribed opioids to treat
moderate-to-severe pain for varying health conditions, such as recent
surgery, injury, or chronic pain.20 Opioid-based medications are also one of
the most common treatments for injured workers.21 As many of us know
through personal experience or from observing the news, “the dangers of
prescription misuse, opioid use disorder, and overdose have been a growing
problem throughout the United States.”22 Since the 1990s, the number of
opioids prescriptions has increased and consequently, the number of
overdoses and deaths from prescription opioids has also increased.23 For
example, in the United States, “[f]rom 1999 to 2019, more than 247,000
people died . . . from overdoses involving prescription opioids.”24

18
Smith v. Jensen Fabricating Eng’rs, Inc., HHDCV186086419, 2019 WL 1569048, at *1, *4
(Conn. Super. Ct. 2019); Noffsinger v. SSC Niantic Operating Co., 273 F. Supp. 3d 326, 330 (D. Conn.
2017); see also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 21a-408p(b)(3) (2012) (stating that “[u]nless required by federal
law or required to obtain federal funding . . . [n]o employer may refuse to hire a person or may discharge,
penalize or threaten an employee solely on the basis of such person’s or employee’s status as a qualifying
patient”).
19
See Nicole Leonard, Connecticut Drug Overdose Deaths Up, with Fentanyl Leading Fatalities,
CT MIRROR (Feb. 17, 2020), https://ctmirror.org/2020/02/17/connecticut-drug-overdose-deaths-up-withfentanyl-leading-fatalities/ (detailing that “[t]he number of people who died in Connecticut from drug
overdoses in 2019 was the most the state has recorded in a single year” and, of the 1,200
fatalities,“[o]pioids . . . were involved in 94% of all cases”).
20
Opioids: Prescription Opioids, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc
.gov/opioids/basics/prescribed.html (last reviewed Aug. 29, 2017).
21
Laurie Jirak, DLI Not Blowing Smoke: Medical Marijuana Valid Workers’ Comp Expense, 25
MINN. EMP. L. LETTER 1, 1 (2015).
22
Drug Overdose: Overview, supra note 3.
23
Id.
24
Id.
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Thankfully, “[o]pioid misuse has declined in recent years at the same
time that cannabis use has been increasing, with many states liberalizing
marijuana laws.”25 Although medical cannabis is a divisive issue, people on
both sides of the debate agree that studies are needed to address the possible
“medical benefits, safety, and dosing of marijuana, so that we can use it for
difficult-to-manage diseases, such as opiate addiction and chronic pain.”26
The systematic reviews completed thus far show that cannabis can help
reduce pain, at least for some conditions.27 For example, a systematic review
examining cannabinoids in the treatment of chronic non-cancer pain found
that cannabinoids are safe and modestly effective in neuropathic pain and
found preliminary evidence of efficacy in rheumatoid arthritis.28 Many injured
workers experience neuropathic pain and are diagnosed with rheumatoid
arthritis. For example, carpal tunnel syndrome is a common diagnosis among
injured workers, most of whom experience neuropathic pain.29
The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine
released a similar report in 2017 that “found evidence to support that patients
who were treated with cannabis or cannabinoids were more likely to
experience a significant reduction in pain symptoms.”30 Accordingly, many
injured workers who might seek out or are prescribed opioid painkillers to
treat their pain could use medical cannabis instead—a drug that has proven
to be far less addictive than opioid prescriptions.31 Several studies have even
linked legal cannabis programs to lower rates of opioid overdoses, indicating

25

Frakt, supra note 5.
Peter Grinspoon, Access to Medical Marijuana Reduces Opioid Prescriptions, HARV. HEALTH
PUBL’G: HARV. HEALTH BLOG (June 25, 2019, 9:34 AM), https://www.health.harvard.edu/blog/accessto-medical-marijuana-reduces-opioid-prescriptions-2018050914509.
27
Frakt, supra note 5.
28
Mary E. Lynch & Fiona Campbell, Cannabinoids for Treatment of Chronic Non-Cancer Pain; A
Systematic Review of Randomized Trials, 72 BRIT. J. CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 735, 735, 737 (2011)
(“Cannabinoids studied included smoked cannabis . . . . Chronic non-cancer pain conditions included
neuropathic pain, fibromyalgia, [and] rheumatoid arthritis . . . . The majority (15 trials) demonstrated a
significant analgesic effect for the cannabinoid agent being investigated.”).
29
Keith T. Palmer, Carpal Tunnel Syndrome: The Role of Occupational Factors, 25 BEST PRAC.
& RSCH. CLINICAL RHEUMATOLOGY 15, 15 (2011). See also Matthew Varacallo & Denise K. Knoblauch,
Occupational Injuries and Workers’ Compensation Management Strategies, S TATPEARLS (“The upper
extremity is the most common location for work-related injuries. Common musculoskeletal injuries that
can occur in association with occupational demands include . . . carpal tunnel syndrome. [Carpal tunnel
syndrome] is associated with overuse of the hands and wrists and forceful, repetitive gripping
requirements.”) (last updated July 18, 2021); Justin O. Sevy & Matthew Varacallo, Carpal Tunnel
Syndrome, STATPEARLS (“Carpal tunnel syndrome (CTS) is an entrapment neuropathy caused by
compression of the median nerve as it travels through the wrist’s carpal tunnel . . . . Early symptoms . . .
include pain . . . .”) (last updated Sept. 10, 2021).
30
Health Effects of Marijuana and Cannabis-Derived Products Presented in New Report, NAT’L
ACADS. SCIS., ENG’G & MED. (Jan. 12, 2017), https://www.nationalacademies.org/news/2017/01/healtheffects-of-marijuana-and-cannabis-derived-products-presented-in-new-report.
31
The CDC explains that “about 1 in 10 marijuana users will become addicted,” while “one in four
patients receiving long-term opioid therapy in a primary care setting struggles with opioid addiction.”
Marijuana and Public Health: Is It Possible for Someone to Become Addicted to
Marijuana?, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/marijuana/faqs/marij
uana-addiction.html (last reviewed Mar. 7, 2018); Opioids: Prescription Opioids, supra note 20.
26
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that access to cannabis can mitigate the opioid epidemic. For example,
“[a]ccording to two studies recently published in JAMA Internal Medicine,
the rate of opiate prescriptions is lower in states where medical marijuana
laws have been passed.”33
Although these systematic reviews and studies have provided hopeful
information about the use of medical cannabis in an effort to reduce opioid
misuse and overdoses, no studies prove a direct causation. The 2014 JAMA
study pointed out that their findings do not prove that medical cannabis
liberalization causes lower opioid-related mortality.34 Further, it is very
difficult to know the true effectiveness of medical cannabis because of the
research barriers in the United States.35 Specifically, “regulatory barriers,
including the classification of cannabis as a Schedule I substance, impede
the advancement of research.”36 Notwithstanding this research barrier,
numerous studies have established the effectiveness of medical cannabis for
pain control. This fact, taken together with knowledge that medical cannabis
is far safer than opioids as it is impossible to overdose on cannabis and it is
far less addictive, leads to the sensible conclusion that medical cannabis is
an effective alternative to opioids.37
II. FEDERAL LAW AND STATE LAW OVERVIEW
A. The Controlled Substance Act and Executive Enforcement
The Controlled Substance Act is the main federal statute regulating the
possession and use of certain substances, including cannabis.38 The CSA was
signed into law by President Nixon in 1970 and was designed “to conquer
drug abuse and to control the legitimate traffic in controlled substances.”39
The CSA places all substances into one of five schedules, which are
primarily “based on the substance’s potential for abuse, safety, and
dependence.”40 Schedule I substances, generally, are substances that “have
32
Marijuana Moment, Marijuana Dispensaries Reduce Local Opioid Overdose Rates, Study Finds,
BOS. GLOBE (Nov. 28, 2018, 2:34 PM), https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/marijuana/2018/11/28/mar
ijuana-dispensaries-reduce-local-opioid-overdose-rates-study-finds/KH1Y1SGfFFFm7ZcyvRuwhM/st
ory.html. See also Marcus A. Bachhuber, Brendan Saloner, Chinazo O. Cunningham & Colleen L. Barry,
Medical Cannabis Laws and Opioid Analgesic Overdose Mortality in the United States, 1999–2010, 174
JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1668, 1669–70 (2014) (explaining that states that have implemented medical
marijuana laws have about a twenty-five percent lower annual rate of opioid overdose deaths than states
without medical marijuana laws).
33
Grinspoon, supra note 26.
34
Frakt, supra note 5.
35
J. Herbie DiFonzo & Ruth C. Stern, Divided We Stand: Medical Marijuana and Federalism, 27
HEALTH L. 17, 17 (2015).
36
NAT’L ACADS. SCIS., ENG’G & MED., supra note 30.
37
Peter Grinspoon, Medical Marijuana, HARV. HEALTH PUBL’G: HARV. HEALTH BLOG (Apr. 10,
2020), https://www.health.harvard.edu/blog/medical-marijuana-2018011513085.
38
21 U.S.C. § 801 (2018).
39
Susan K.H. Conley & Jeffrey M. Markowitz, Pot for Pain: A Courtroom Conundrum in Workers’
Compensation, 61 DRI FOR DEF. 46, 47 (2019) (citing Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 12 (2005)).
40
Id.; 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2018).
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a high potential for abuse, for which there is no currently accepted medical
use” in treatment in the U.S.41 Moreover, in the federal government’s
opinion, “[t]here is a lack of accepted safety for use of the [Schedule I] drug
or other substance under medical supervision.”42
Despite the evidence that medical cannabis is an effective option for pain
management, the CSA prohibits cannabis as a Schedule I drug, alongside
drugs such as heroin and MDMA (ecstasy).43 Thus, the CSA makes it a crime
“to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to
manufacture, distribute, or dispense” cannabis knowingly or intentionally.44
The CSA further criminalizes “knowingly or intentionally . . . possess[ing] a
controlled substance.”45 Under the CSA, federal prosecution can be directed
against a principal, which is defined as any individual who “commits an
offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands,
induces or procures its commission.”46
Unfortunately, the CSA imposes harsh criminal penalties for Schedule I
substances, including “prison sentences of ten or even twenty years in
extreme cases, in addition to stiff fines.”47 “Of particular concern to
employers and workers’ compensation insurers, those penalties are not
reserved for principal actors.”48 Instead, the CSA extends the same penalties
41

21 U.S.C. § 812 (2018); Conley & Markowitz, supra note 39, at 47.
21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1)(C) (2018); Conley & Markowitz, supra note 39, at 47.
21 U.S.C. § 812(c) (2018) (describing the schedules of controlled substances and specifically
indicating that “marihuana” is classified as Schedule I); Conley & Markowitz, supra note 39, at 47. It is
important to note, however, that the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) “recognizes the potential
opportunities that cannabis or cannabis-derived compounds may offer” and, in 2018, the FDA approved
Epidiolex, which contains a purified form of CBD for limited medical treatment. FDA REGULATION OF
CANNABIS AND CANNABIS-DERIVED PRODUCTS, INCLUDING CANNABIDIOL (CBD), U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN. (Jan. 22, 2021), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/public-health-focus/fda-regulation-cannabisand-cannabis-derived-products-including-cannabidiol-cbd; AGATA DABROWSKA, VICTORIA R. GREEN,
RENÉE JOHNSON & LISA N. SACCO, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46189, FDA REGULATION OF CANNABIDIOL
(CBD) CONSUMER PRODUCTS: OVERVIEW AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR CONGRESS 6 (2020). The DEA,
in response, issued an order placing FDA-approved drugs that contain CBD and no more than 0.1% THC
in Schedule V. Schedules of Controlled Substances: Placement in Schedule V of Certain FDA-Approved
Drugs Containing Cannabidiol; Corresponding Change to Permit Requirements, 83 FED. REG. 48,950
(Sept. 28, 2018) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 1308, 1312). The Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018,
otherwise known as the 2018 Farm Bill, also changed “certain federal authorities relating to the
production and marketing of hemp . . . . includ[ing] removing hemp from the CSA, which means that
cannabis plants and derivatives that contain no more than 0.3 percent THC . . . are no longer controlled
substances under federal law.” FDA REGULATION OF CANNABIS AND CANNABIS-DERIVED PRODUCTS,
INCLUDING CANNABIDIOL (CBD), supra.
44
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2018); 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (describing the penalties for distribution of
controlled substances).
45
21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (2018) (describing the penalties for simple possession of controlled
substances).
46
18 U.S.C. § 2 (2018) (defining principal) (emphasis added); 21 U.S.C. § 854(a) (2018) (referring
to a principal within the meaning of § 2 of Title 18); Conley & Markowitz, supra note 39, at 49–50. The
CSA also provides that “[a]ny person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense defined in this
subchapter shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense, the commission of
which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy.” 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2018).
47
Conley & Markowitz, supra note 39, at 50 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (2018)).
48
Sue Conley & Jeff Markowitz, Workers’ Compensation for Medical Marijuana? Not So Fast.,
77 BENCH & BAR MINN. 27, 28 (2020).
42
43
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to any person who conspires to commit the offense, and anyone who is found
to aid or abet is punishable as a principal.49 Part IV addresses the
implications of the CSA general aiding-and abetting provision, specifically,
the possibility of federal prosecution against insurance carriers if they cover
the cost for medical cannabis.
Starting with President Obama’s administration, however, the U.S.
Department of Justice (DOJ) has adopted a “hands-off approach” regarding
federal enforcement of the CSA in states that legalized or medicalized
cannabis.50 President Obama’s DOJ, per three memoranda, established
policy guidelines regarding federal prosecution of medical cannabis, namely
by advising prosecutors that resources should be directed elsewhere.51 The
August 2013 Cole Memorandum, in particular, provided that “as long as
dispensaries, providers, and individuals comply with state law in the
distribution and use of medical marijuana, the federal government will not
prosecute.”52 On January 4, 2018, Attorney General (AG) Jeff Sessions
rescinded these three memos, permitting individual U.S. attorneys “to decide
how aggressively to go after marijuana in their jurisdictions” and stating that
“the previous issuance of guidance undermines the rule of law.”53
Thankfully, Sessions’ tenure as AG only lasted one year,54 and his
replacement, AG William Barr, accepted the Cole Memorandum.55 In fact,
AG Barr testified in his Senate Confirmation Hearing that “removing the
federal government from the situation and allowing states to set their own
cannabis policy would be an improvement over the present scenario, which
. . . [is] an ‘intolerable’ conflict between federal and state laws.”56
49

Id. See 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2018); 18 U.S.C. § 2 (defining a principal).
Laura Jarrett, Sessions Nixes Obama-Era Rules Leaving States Alone That Legalize Pot, CNN
(Jan. 4, 2018, 5:44 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/01/04/politics/jeff-sessions-cole-memo/index.html.
51
Memorandum from David W. Ogden, U.S. Deputy Att'y Gen., to Selected U.S. Att'ys (Oct. 19,
2009); Memorandum from James M. Cole, U.S. Deputy Att'y Gen., to U.S. Att'ys (June 29, 2011);
Memorandum from James M. Cole, U.S. Deputy Att'y Gen., to all U.S. Att'ys (Aug. 29, 2013); Conley
& Markowitz, supra note 39, at 46; Sarah N. Lynch, Trump Administration Drops Obama-Era Easing
of Marijuana Prosecutions, REUTERS (Jan. 4, 2018, 9:39 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usajustice-marijuana/trump-administration-drops-obama-era-easing-of-marijuana-prosecutionsidUSKBN1ET1MU.
52
Conley & Markowitz, supra note 39, at 47 (citing Memorandum from James M. Cole (Aug. 29,
2013), supra note 51).
53
Ryan Lucas, Attorney General Rescinds Obama-Era Marijuana Guidelines, NPR (Jan. 4, 2018,
12:52 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/01/04/575679429/attorney-general-rescinds-obama-era-marijuan
a-guidelines.
54
See Attorney General: Jeff Sessions, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Nov. 8, 2018), https://www.justice.
gov/ag/bio/attorney-general-jeff-sessions (explaining that AG Sessions served for one year, from 2017–
2018).
55
Sara Brittany Somerset, Attorney General Barr Favors a More Lenient Approach to Cannabis
Prohibition, FORBES (Apr. 15, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/sarabrittanysomerset/201
9/04/15/attorney-general-barr-favors-a-more-lenient-approach-to-cannabis-legalization/#597ca3ecc4c8.
56
Id. AG Bar, however, allegedly directed “the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division to carry
out investigations into 10 marijuana mergers out of personal animus for the industry.” Kyle Jaeger, Biden
AG Stresses that Marijuana Use in Legal States is Not a Justice Department Priority, MARIJUANA
MOMENT (May 4, 2021), https://www.marijuanamoment.net/biden-ag-stresses-that-marijuana-use-inlegal-states-is-not-a-justice-department-priority/.
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President Biden’s U.S. AG, Merrick Garland, is expected to continue
this hands-off approach.57 For example, AG Garland has “reaffirmed that he
does not feel the [DOJ] should be using its limited recourses to go after
people using marijuana in compliance with state law.”58 However, “[i]t’s not
clear if the [DOJ] will issue a new cannabis prosecution guidance memo
under Garland.”59 Nonetheless, “[t]he belief is that Garland’s confirmation
could potentially usher in a more marijuana-friendly Department of Justice
than existed in the Trump Administration.”60 For example, unlike his
predecessors, AG Garland recognized that “criminalizing the use of marijuana
has contributed to mass incarceration and racial disparities in our criminal
justice system.”61 Accordingly, although “Garland ‘did not explicitly state a
position on efforts to make cannabis legal,’ the one-time federal judge’s
other marijuana positions give [industry trade groups] a lot of hope.”62
Additionally, President Biden nominated, and the Senate subsequently
confirmed, civil rights advocates Vanita Gupta for Associate AG, and
Kristen Clarke for Assistant AG for the Department’s Civil Rights Division,
both of whom expressed explicit support of cannabis legalization.63
“Together, the picks could have far-reaching implications for marijuana policy
. . . . [and] can be viewed as encouraging from an advocacy standpoint.”64
Congress is in the real power position to finally end the federal
prohibition of medical cannabis. Still, “[a]s Attorney General, Garland
would be in a position to unilaterally initiate a petition to reschedule
cannabis. As head of the Justice Department, under which DEA is organized,
he would also have considerable influence of the agency’s scheduling and
enforcement policies when it comes to marijuana.”65 Accordingly, it will be
important to observe AG Garland’s statements and actions regarding
cannabis reclassification, including his response to Senator Warren and
Senator Booker’s letter calling on him to “initiate a descheduling process.”66
57

Jaeger, supra note 56.
Id.
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Id.
60
John Schroyer, Garland’s Confirmation As AG Could Change Feds’ Marijuana Views,
MARIJUANA BUS. DAILY (March 23, 2021), https://mjbizdaily.com/garland-confirmation-as-attorneygeneral-could-change-feds-marijuana-views/.
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Jaeger, supra note 56.
62
Schroyer, supra note 59.
63
Kyle Jaeger, Biden AG Pick Merrick Garland Wants to Defer to DEA on Marijuana Science and
Classification, MARIJUANA MOMENT (Jan. 7, 2021), https://www.marijuanamoment.net/biden-ag-pickmerrick-garland-wants-to-defer-to-dea-on-marijuana-science-and-classification/; Jason Breslow, Civil
Rights Attorney Vanita Gupta Confirmed As Associate Attorney General, NPR (Apr. 21, 2021, 6:29 PM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/trial-over-killing-of-george-floyd/2021/04/21/989599055/civil-rightsattorney-vanita-gupta-confirmed-as-associate-attorney-general; Sarah N. Lynch, U.S. Senate Confirms
Kristen Clarke As Top Justice Dept. Civil Rights Lawyer, REUTERS (May 26, 2021, 5:45 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-senate-confirms-kristen-clarke-top-justice-dept-civil-rightslawyer-2021-05-25/.
64
Jaeger, supra note 63.
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Id.
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Kyle Jaeger, Senators Push U.S. Attorney General To Decriminalize Marijuana ‘Now’ As
Congress Debates Reform Bills, MARIJUANA MOMENT (Oct. 8, 2021), https://www.marijuanamoment.
58

956

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:4

Nonetheless, cannabis users, business owners, and, as this Note argues,
workers’ compensation respondents in states that have medicalized cannabis
can take solace in knowing that AG Garland is expected to continue the
DOJ’s hands-off policy and will respect state cannabis programs.67
B. Pending Federal Legislation
Congress has introduced numerous cannabis reform bills, including
legalization and rescheduling of cannabis. However, most of these bills have
either failed or stalled in committee.68 Recently, the U.S. House of
Representatives (House) has re-introduced the Marijuana Opportunity
Reinvestment and Expungement Act of 2021 (the MORE Act), which would
“remove cannabis from the CSA and expunge cannabis convictions. In
addition, this Act would bring in federal tax revenue . . . [and] [t]his tax
revenue would fund the federal Opportunity Trust Fund to be used for
community reinvestment.”69
A similar measure was [recently] introduced in the Senate as
the Cannabis Administrative Opportunity Act (‘CAOA’).
Similar to the MORE Act, CAOA would decriminalize and
deschedule marijuana federally. While CAOA recognizes
state law as controlling the possession, production and
distribution of cannabis, the law would preempt states from
interfering with interstate commerce where a lawful cannabis
delivery requires transport through the state's borders.70
Unfortunately, these two more expansive bills do not have broad
bi-partisan support.71
A narrower bill, known as the SAFE Banking Act,
would offer protection to financial institutions that do business
with state-licensed marijuana businesses and would otherwise
be subject to prosecution for ‘aiding or abetting’ the violation
of federal drug and money laundering laws. . . It has already
passed the House five times in various forms . . . with 106
Republicans in support.”72

net/senators-push-u-s-attorney-general-to-decriminalize-marijuana-now-as-congress-debatesreform-bills/.
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68
Conley & Markowitz, supra note 39, at 47.
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Alex Malyshev & Sarah Ganley, Reading the Tea Leaves: What Might Federal Legalization of
Marijuana Look Like?, REUTERS (Nov. 15, 2021, 10:14 AM), https://www.reuters.com/legal/litigation/
reading-tea-leaves-what-might-federal-legalization-marijuana-look-like-2021-11-15/.
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Mike DeBonis, Democratic Divide Puts Congressional Action on Marijuana In Doubt, WASH.
POST (Nov. 18, 2021, 6:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/marijuana-democratslegalize/2021/11/17/61dd37b4-47b3-11ec-95dc-5f2a96e00fa3_story.html.
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Lawmakers are pushing
to attach the narrower banking legislation to the must-pass
annual defense policy bill, which would ensure ts passage in
the coming months. . . . That push has hit a roadblock in the
Senate, however, where [certain democratic senators], who are
seeking to assemble [the CAOA] . . . . Passing the narrower
bill, they argue, would make passing their broader bill more
difficult.73
Although the broader bills introduced by democratic lawmakers are not
receiving as much bipartisan support, republicans have supported efforts to
ensure states have control over cannabis legislation.74
Recently, “the first federal bill to legalize marijuana from a Republican
was introduced. Its conservative roots are expected to give it better prospects
in the Senate, unlike the Democratic proposals that preceded it . . . .”75 As
Congresswoman Nancy Mace, who introduced the States Reform Act,
makes clear “cannabis is an issue that is truly bipartisan; it’s overwhelmingly
supported by Republicans and Democrats alike.”76 Congresswoman Mace
also explained how she became more open to cannabis based on her own
personal experiences, including having “family that have overdosed from
hardcore opiates and prescription drugs.”77 Accordingly, the bipartisan
support of cannabis decriminalization and President Biden’s own support of
federal decriminalization78 provide particular hope that either the States
Reform Act or a similar bill will pass sooner rather than later.
C. Federal Funding
Ideally, Congress will soon pass cannabis legislation aimed at ending
this federal-state conflict so that those complying with their state cannabis
laws do not have to fear federal prosecution. In the meantime, “[s]ince
December 2014, there has been a provision in the federal budget that,
generally stated, denies funds to the U.S. Department of Justice (the DOJ)
to prosecute conduct that is in compliance with state medical-marijuana
73

Id.
Last year, a bill called the STATES Act, which would amend the CSA so that its provisions no
longer apply to any person acting in compliance with State or tribal laws, received bi-partisan support,
including both Republican and Democratic original co-sponsors. See STATES Act, H.R. 2093, 116th Cong.
§§ 1–6 (2019) (the House version had sixty-five cosponsors, including both republican and democratic
original cosponsors); Strengthening the Tenth Amendment Through Entrusting States Act, S. 1028, 116th
Cong. §§ 1–6 (2019) (the Senate version was introduced by both Republican Senator Cory Gardner and had
nine cosponsors). These bills have not been re-introduced in the 117th congressional session.
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Tiffany Kary, A Republican Congresswoman’s Formative Moment With Marijuana,
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 22, 2021, 7:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2021-1122/republican-nancy-mace-came-to-cannabis-after-a-personal-tragedy.
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Id.
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Id.
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Tim Craig, Biden, Once a Warrior in the ‘War on Drugs,’ May Slowly Retreat, WASH. POST (Jan.
11, 2021, 8:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/01/11/biden-war-on-drugs/.
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law.” This rider, known as the Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment, thus prohibits
the DOJ from using funds “to interfere with the implementation of state
medical marijuana laws.”80 The rider has been renewed in each appropriations
bill since 2014, including in the Fiscal Year 2021 spending legislation, which
former President Trump signed into law on December 27, 2020.81
Thus, through September 30, 2021, medical cannabis users and business
owners in the thirty-six states that have medicalized cannabis have some
level of protection against DOJ prosecution for conduct that is in compliance
with their state laws.82 Accordingly, even during the Trump presidency and
a Republican-controlled Senate, the legislature took steps to ensure that
federal resources would not be wasted on prosecuting people and businesses
who are in compliance with their states’ medical cannabis laws.83
79

D. State Law and the Preemption Doctrine
Despite federal law, the majority of states in the U.S. have either
legalized medical cannabis or decriminalized cannabis.84 As of December
2021, thirty-six states, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and
U.S. Virgin Islands passed laws legalizing some form of medicinal cannabis
use.85 An additional twelve states passed laws that allow the “use of
‘low-THC, high cannabidiol (CBD)’ products for medical reasons in limited

79
Zachary S. Roman, Tenth Circuit Decision Clears the Way for Further Judicial Consideration of
Application of Recently Re-Enacted Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment, REEDSMITH (Dec. 27, 2019),
https://www.reedsmith.com/en/perspectives/2019/12/tenth-circuit-decision-clears-the-way-for-furtherjudicial-consideration.
80
Conley & Markowitz, supra note 39, at 46; Roman, supra note 79.
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Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, Pub. L. No. 116-260, § 531, 134 Stat. 1182, 1282-83
(2020); Seung Min Kim, Jeff Stein, Mike DeBonis & Josh Dawsey, Trump Signs Stimulus and
Government Spending Bill into Law, Averting Shutdown, WASH. POST. (Dec. 27, 2020, 9:34 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/us-policy/2020/12/27/trump-stimulus-shutdown-congress/;
Kyle
Jaeger, Congressional Funding Bill Restores Financial Aid for Students with Drug Convictions, and Has
Other Marijuana Provisions, MARIJUANA MOMENT (Dec. 21, 2020), https://www.marijuanamoment.ne
t/congressional-funding-bill-restores-financial-aid-for-students-with-drug-convictions-and-has-othermarijuana-provisions/ [hereinafter Congressional Funding] (“The new appropriations and COVID relief
legislation also contains . . . the extension of a longstanding rider protecting legal medical marijuana
programs from federal interference . . . .”).
82
Jaeger, Congressional Funding, supra note 81; Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, Pub. L.
No. 116-260, § 531, 134 Stat. 1182, 1282-83 (2020).
83
President Trump, however, ensured to include in his signing statements for the 2017, 2018, and
2019 appropriation bills that his “[a]dministration will treat [the Rohrabacher-Farr] provision consistent
with the President’s constitutional responsibility to faithfully execute the laws of the United States.” Tom
Angell, Trump Says He Can Ignore Medical Marijuana Protections Passed by Congress, FORBES (Dec.
21, 2019, 10:40 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/tomangell/2019/12/21/trump-says-he-can-ignoremedical-marijuana-protections-passed-by-congress/#d96d7e64256f. Arguably, “[b]y calling out the
medical marijuana rider, Trump [was] making clear that his administration . . . [could] broadly enforce
federal drug laws against people complying with state medical marijuana laws even though Congress
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State Medical Marijuana Laws, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES, https://www.ncsl.org/rese
arch/health/state-medical-marijuana-laws.aspx (last visited Dec. 19, 2021).
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situations or as a legal defense.” Eighteen states, the District of Columbia,
Guam, and Northern Mariana Islands passed legislation that legalizes
recreational adult use of cannabis.87 Consequently, as of December 2021,
only two states, Idaho and Nebraska, have not legalized cannabis or
low-THC CBD products for medical reasons or as a legal defense.88
Nebraska, however, partially decriminalized cannabis, allowing first-time
offenders arrested for possession of one ounce or less to face no jail time but
pay an infraction.89 An additional twenty-six states, and the District of
Columbia, have wholly or partially decriminalized cannabis possession
offenses.90 The CSA, however, fully criminalizes cannabis in any amount or
form and thus does not recognize the difference between medical and
recreational use.91 Accordingly, forty-nine states, the District of Columbia,
and four U.S. territories all passed laws that possibly conflict with the CSA.
This federal-state conflict presents the issue of federal preemption, or
more specifically, whether the CSA preempts many of these states’ laws
regulating cannabis. The preemption doctrine is derived from the Supremacy
Clause, which states that, “the laws of the United States . . . shall be the
supreme law of the land,” giving federal law precedence over state law.92
The case law that has developed the preemption doctrine instructs that there
are two main types of preemption: express and implied.93 State laws are
often challenged on the grounds of implied preemption, and more
specifically, a type of implied preemption called conflict preemption. 94
“When the state law is drafted in such a way that it becomes impossible to
comply simultaneously with both the state and federal laws, it is recognized
86
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a written recommendation from a physician possess only ‘an affirmative defense to prosecution’ with
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classified as Schedule I); Federal Laws and Penalties, NORML, https://norml.org/laws/federalpenalties-2/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2021) (detailing that possession of “any amount” of cannabis carries a
one-year incarceration sentence).
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made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . .”); see Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 29 (2005)
(“The Supremacy Clause unambiguously provides that if there is any conflict between federal and state
law, federal law shall prevail.”).
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Conley & Markowitz, supra note 39, at 47. See, e.g., Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S.
861, 884 (2000) (“[T]his Court traditionally distinguishes between ‘express’ and ‘implied’ pre-emptive
intent . . . .”).
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Conley & Markowitz, supra note 39, at 47; see Geier, 529 U.S. at 884 (“[T]his Court traditionally
. . . treats ‘conflict’ pre-emption as an instance of [implied pre-emptive intent].”).
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as ‘conflict preemption.’” In other words, the Supremacy Clause, and by
extension the preemption doctrine, dictates that when federal law conflicts
with state law, federal law prevails.96
The CSA dictates that state laws are preempted if there is a “positive
conflict.”97 Similarly, multiple state courts have held that the state law is
preempted when the two laws cannot consistently stand together.98 State
courts, however, are divided when interpreting this provision in cases
involving cannabis.99 For example, courts in Colorado, New Mexico, Maine,
and Oregon have held that their state provisions were preempted by the CSA.100
Specifically, the Supreme Court of Oregon found that the state provision
legalizing possession of cannabis presented an obstacle to enforcement of the
CSA, thereby creating a conflict.101 On the other hand, Arizona, California,
and Michigan “courts have held that the laws decriminalizing medical
marijuana did not pose an obstacle to the federal enforcement of federal
law,” and, thus, state law was not preempted by the CSA.102
In 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court took up the issue of federal preemption
as it relates to state cannabis law in Gonzales v. Raich.103 Angel Raich and
Diane Monson were prescribed cannabis for numerous ailments, including
for relief from severe, chronic pain.104 Although Raich and Monson’s use of
the medical cannabis was legal under California’s Compassionate Care Act,
95

95

Conley & Markowitz, supra note 39, at 47.
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intent on the part of the Congress to occupy the field in which that provision operates, including criminal
penalties, to the exclusion of any State law on the same subject matter which would otherwise be within
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Maine that held the state laws were preempted by the CSA); People v. Crouse, 388 P.3d 39, 43 (Colo.
2017) (holding that the medical marijuana amendment was preempted by the CSA and rendered void);
Garcia v. Tractor Supply Co., 154 F. Supp. 3d 1225, 1225 (D.N.M. 2016) (holding that the “Controlled
Substances Act . . . preempted interpretation [of the] CUA [the state cannabis law] . . . as requiring [the]
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Co., 187 A.3d 10, 10 (2018) (holding “that the federal . . . [CSA] precluded, due to conflict preemption,
application of the Maine Medical Use of Marijuana Act (MMUMA) as a predicate for compelling [the]
employer to reimburse [the] claimant for medical marijuana”); Emerald Steel Fabricators v. Bureau of
Lab. & Indus., 230 P.3d 518, 518 (Or. 2010) (holding that the “provision of Oregon Medical Marijuana
Act affirmatively authorizing the use of medical marijuana was preempted by Federal [CSA], which
explicitly prohibited marijuana use with regard to medicinal purpose”).
101
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(Ariz. Ct. App. 2014), aff’d, 347 P.3d 136 (Ariz. 2015); Qualified Patients Ass’n v. City of Anaheim,
187 Cal. App. 4th 734 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010); Ter Beek v. City of Wyoming, 846 N.W.2d 531, 537–41
(Mich. 2014).
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their actions were illegal under federal law. Thus, they “sued the federal
government seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the federal
government from interfering with [their] [prescription for cannabis] and
prosecuting [them] under the CSA.”106 The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the
CSA as constitutionally permissible under the Commerce Clause power,
finding that California and eight other similar state laws legalizing Monson
and “Raich’s conduct had no impact . . . on federal law enforcement.”107
However, the Court also found that the CSA did not invalidate the contrary
California state law.108
At the appellate level, the Eighth Circuit recently upheld the Minnesota
District Court’s finding that a criminal defendant’s “use of marijuana—even
for medical purposes—contravenes federal law” under the CSA.109 The
court stated, “[a]lthough some medical marijuana is legal in Minnesota as a
matter of state law, the state’s law conflicts with federal law.”110
Consequently, the court concluded that “the district court had no discretion
to allow [the defendant] to use medical marijuana while on supervised
release,” even though the defendant’s “physician prescribed him medical
marijuana for chronic pain.”111
Today, the Justice Department generally declines to enforce the CSA
“when a person or company buys or sells marijuana in accordance with state
law.”112 “Congress reinforce[s] this arrangement” through its reenactment of
the Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment each year.113 The Ninth Circuit provided
that, at a minimum, the Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment “prohibits [the] DOJ
from spending funds from relevant appropriations acts for the prosecution
of individuals who engaged in conduct permitted by the State Medical
Marijuana Laws and who fully complied with such laws.”114 However, the
Ninth Circuit also cautioned that Congress could restore funding next year,
and the Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment “does not provide immunity from
prosecution for federal marijuana offenses.”115 This is the current status of
105

105
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patients and cannabis programs from federal marijuana prosecutions in states that allow it for medical
use.”).
114
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cannabis law in the United States today, “with the federal government
continuing to bury its head in the sand and failing to enact bills to legalize
[cannabis].”116 The lack of stability on this issue complicates workers’
compensation coverage for medical cannabis as respondents argue that
reimbursing the cost of cannabis would break federal law. 117 Nonetheless,
right now there is no indication that Congress will stop passing “stopgap
legal protections” for medical cannabis programs.118 Accordingly, as this
Note will develop further below, this speculative risk should not outweigh a
claimant’s present need for an effective, less deadly pain relief treatment.119
III. CONNECTICUT LAW
This Note argues how the CT Appellate Court or Supreme Court should
rule regarding workers’ compensation coverage for medical cannabis.
Accordingly, it is important to first outline the Connecticut’s Palliative Use
of Marijuana Act and the Connecticut’s Workers’ Compensation Act.
Thereafter, Part III will introduce the two Connecticut Compensation
Review Board (CRB) holdings that currently dictate Connecticut’s law on
workers’ compensation coverage for medical cannabis.
A. PUMA and Connecticut’s Workers’ Compensation Statute
Connecticut arguably decided to break federal law by enacting the
Palliative Use of Marijuana Act (PUMA) in 2012.120 “The law permits a
qualified patient to purchase and use a limited amount of medical marijuana
to manage the symptoms of a debilitating medical condition as enumerated
in [the General Statutes of Connecticut section] 21a-408(3).”121 The CSA
illegalizes cannabis in any form and therefore does not recognize the
difference between medical and recreational use.122 Thus, PUMA conflicts
with the CSA’s prohibition on allowing the possession and distribution of
cannabis and arguably conflicts with CSA’s prohibition on doctors
prescribing cannabis.123 Lastly, PUMA provides that health insurance
116

Conley & Markowitz, supra note 39, at 47.
Caye v. Thyssenkrupp Elevator, No. 6296 CRB-1-18-11, 2019 WL 6168483, at *4 (Conn.
Workers’ Comp. Comm’n Rev. Div. Oct. 29, 2019).
118
Id. at *10.
119
Id.
120
CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 21a-408–408v (2020); Connecticut: Medicinal Marijuana Legalization
Measure Signed into Law, NORML (June 7, 2012), https://norml.org/news/2012/06/07/connecticutmedicinal-marijuana-legalization-measure-signed-into-law.
121
Abbott, supra note 12, at 6; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 21a-408a (2020); id. § 21a-408(3). See
Qualification Requirements, CONN. STATE DEP’T CONSUMER PROT., https://portal.ct.gov/DCP/MedicalMarijuana-Program/Qualification-Requirements (last visited Jan. 31, 2021).
122
21 U.S.C. § 812 (2018); Conley & Markowitz, supra note 39, at 47.
123
21 U.S.C. § 829 (2018) (listing “Prescriptions” as Schedule II, III, IV, and V substances, but not
as Schedule I substances); United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 491 (2001);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 21a-408a(a)(1) (2020). Technically, PUMA allows physicians to issue a written
certification to qualifying patients for the palliative use of cannabis “after the physician . . . has
prescribed, or determined it is not in the best interest of the patient to prescribe, prescription drugs to
117
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carriers are not required to provide coverage for medical use. However,
as discussed in Part IV, the CRB in Petrini did not believe that this provision
excluded workers’ compensation coverage.125
The Connecticut’s Workers’ Compensation Act generally provides that
in the event an employee is injured due to a work-related incident, the
employer must “provide[] medical care for the compensable condition and
limited wage-loss benefits.”126 Often, the question presented is whether “a
particular incident or exposure in the course of employment cause[d] the
condition at issue, or cause[d] the need for medical treatment at issue.”127 If
the answer to this question is yes, then the injury is compensable, and the
employer is mandated to provide medical care.128 Specifically, Connecticut
General Statute § 31-294d(a)(1) mandates the employer’s obligation to
provide medical care for workplace injuries found to be compensable.129
Section 31-294d(a)(1) further states that the employer is responsible for
paying the cost for “prescription drugs, as the physician, or . . . surgeon
deems reasonable or necessary.”130 Moreover, § 31-294d(a)(1) provides that
“[t]he employer, [or] any insurer acting on behalf of the employer . . . shall
be responsible for paying the cost of such prescription drugs directly to the
provider.”131 However, claimants have the choice to either “pay prescription
expenses themselves and then seek reimbursement, or obtain a prescription
card from the adjuster, which will allow the charges to be billed directly to
the carrier.”132

address the symptoms or effects for which the certification is being issued.” Id. Thus, the provision seems
to indicate that there is a difference between a physician prescribing and certifying medication; however,
in practice, there is a strong argument that this certification still conflicts with CSA’s prescription
prohibition of Schedule I drugs.
124
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 21a-408o (2020).
125
Petrini v. Marcus Dairy, Inc., No. 6021 CRB-7-15-7, 2016 WL 6659149, at *5 (Conn. Workers’
Comp. Comm’n Rev. Div. May 12, 2016).
126
19 ROBERT F. CARTER, DONNA CIVITELLO, JASON M. DODGE, JAMES POMERANZ & LUCAS D.
STRUNK, CONNECTICUT PRACTICE SERIES, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION § 1:2, Westlaw (database
updated Dec. 2020).
127
Id. § 1:11.
128
Id. § 8:2; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-294d(a)(1) (2020) (“The employer . . . shall provide a
competent physician[] [or] surgeon . . . to attend the injured employee and, in addition, shall furnish any
medical and surgical aid . . . including . . . prescription drugs, as the physician, or . . . surgeon deems
reasonable or necessary. The employer[] [or] any insurer acting on behalf of the employer . . . shall be
responsible for paying . . . .”).
129
§ 31-294d(a)(1); CARTER ET AL., supra note 126, § 8:2 (citing Vargas v. King-Conn Enters., No.
3333 CRB-4-96-4, 1997 WL 662363, at *2 (Conn. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n Rev. Div. Oct. 24, 1997)
and § 31-294d(a)(1)).
130
§ 31-294d(a)(1). See also CARTER ET AL., supra note 126, § 8:5 (discussing the requirement that
the employer be liable for all reasonable or necessary treatment ordered by an authorized treating
physician).
131
§ 31-294d(a)(1); CARTER ET AL., supra note 126, § 8:19.
132
CARTER ET AL., supra note 126, § 8:19 (detailing that there are often challenges in obtaining and
using prescription cards, such as limitations on the types of medications that they can be used for and/or
the adjuster failing to update the card to reflect changes in medications).
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The employer can contest its liability to pay for a particular medical
treatment by filing a “Form 43” with the commission.133 In the event that the
“parties dispute whether particular medical treatment is reasonable or
necessary, the commissioner is the arbiter.”134 A commissioner, applying the
Bowen standard,135 decides what is reasonable or necessary medical care by
determining that which is “curative or remedial. Curative or remedial care is
that which seeks to repair the damage to health care caused by the job even
if not enough health is restored to enable the employee to return to work.”136
B. Relevant Case Law: Introducing Petrini and Caye
The CRB case, Petrini v. Marcus Dairy, Inc., was the first case in
Connecticut addressing whether the Connecticut Workers’ Compensation
Commission can order a respondent to pay for medical cannabis.137 The
claimant, Mr. Petrini, was “totally disabled following a failed back
surgery.”138 Mr. Petrini took a large number of narcotic and non-narcotic
medications for six years, without significant pain relief and with a number
of unhealthy side effects.139 Mr. Petrini asked his authorizing treating
physician about medical cannabis, but when that doctor resisted, Mr. Petrini
went on his own to one of the three physicians in Connecticut licensed at the
time to prescribe medical cannabis.140 This doctor prescribed Mr. Petrini
medical cannabis and, thankfully, he “obtained so much relief that he was
able to stop using six of his medications, and rarely used any narcotics.”141
The treating physician, after observing the results, wrote that “there
should be no question of the medical necessity in substituting medical
marijuana for opiate medications.”142 The claimant testified “that his
functional level and his mood had significantly improved as a result of the
medical [cannabis] treatment.”143 The trial commissioner found, based on all
available evidence, that the use of medical cannabis “‘significantly increased
his function, and is remedial in nature.’ . . . ‘[U]nder our law, reasonable or
necessary medical care is that which is curative or remedial.’”144 The trial
133
Id. § 8:2 (“Where the right to any or a particular medical treatment recommended by the treating
physician is contested by the employer, the commissioner may order a commissioner’s examination with
a medical provider of his or her choice. The commissioner, however, is not obligated to order such an
exam to resolve disputed questions of medical treatment.”).
134
Id. § 8:5.
135
Id. § 8:15 (citing Bowen v. Stanadyne, No. 232 CRD-1-83, 1984 WL 20298, at *3 (Conn.
Workers’ Comp. Comm’n Rev. Div. June 19, 1984)).
136
Petrini v. Marcus Dairy, Inc., No. 6021 CRB-7-15-7, 2016 WL 6659149, at *3 (Conn. Workers’
Comp. Comm’n Rev. Div. May 12, 2016).
137
CARTER ET AL., supra note 126, § 8:3; Petrini, 2016 WL 6659149, at *1, *5.
138
CARTER ET AL., supra note 126, § 8:3; Petrini, 2016 WL 6659149, at *1.
139
CARTER ET AL., supra note 126, § 8:3; Petrini, 2016 WL 6659149, at *1.
140
CARTER ET AL., supra note 126, § 8:3; Petrini, 2016 WL 6659149, at *2.
141
CARTER ET AL., supra note 126, § 8:3; Petrini, 2016 WL 6659149, at *2.
142
Petrini, 2016 WL 6659149, at *2; CARTER ET AL., supra note 126, § 8:3.
143
CARTER ET AL., supra note 126, § 8:3; Petrini, 2016 WL 6659149, at *3.
144
Petrini, 2016 WL 6659149, at *3.

2022]

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION FOR MEDICAL CANNABIS

965

commissioner also ordered the respondents to pay the cost of the medical
cannabis going forward and to reimburse the claimant for his out-of-pocket
medical cannabis expenses.145
The CRB upheld the trial commissioner’s finding that medical cannabis
was a reasonable and necessary medical treatment.146 Thus, “[t]he CRB held
. . . that medical marijuana prescribed in accordance with the medical
marijuana enabling act will be treated by the Commission like any other
prescription medication under the Workers’ Compensation Act.”147 The
CRB rejected all of respondents’ arguments on appeal, including
respondents’ assertion of “general negative policy implications,” which
included the public policy argument that cannabis is still classified as a
Schedule I substance and is illegal under federal law.148 The Respondents
appealed again to the CT Appellate Court but withdrew the appeal before a
decision was rendered.149
In Petrini, the CRB affirmed the trial commissioner’s decision “that the
claimant’s use of medical marijuana as a substitute for opioids for chronic
pain constituted reasonable and necessary medical treatment under” the
Workers’ Compensation Act.150 Thus, Petrini was arguably a landmark case
in Connecticut for injured workers who seek access to medical cannabis as
alternative pain relief—at least, it should have been. Some employers and
their workers’ compensation insurance carriers, however, still resisted
paying for medical cannabis because Petrini failed to answer the federal
preemption issue.151 Namely, the CRB did not squarely address whether
employers or insurance carriers can be mandated to pay or reimburse claimants
for medical cannabis because cannabis is illegal under federal law.152
Enter Caye v. Thyssenkrupp Elevator, where the CRB squarely
addressed the question “[d]oes the federal Controlled Substances Act . . .
proscribe a state agency from ordering an insurance carrier to pay or
reimburse for marijuana prescriptions?”153 In this case, the insurer appealed
from the trial commissioner’s order for it to pay for the claimant’s medical
cannabis prescription and reimburse his expenses for medical cannabis.154
The respondents argued that the CSA preempts PUMA, and, because the CSA
criminalizes aiding and abetting the procurement of cannabis, insurers cannot
be ordered by a state court or administrative agency to violate the federal

145

Id. at *4.
CARTER ET AL. , supra note 126, § 8:3; Petrini, 2016 WL 6659149, at *4, *11.
147
CARTER ET AL., supra note 126, § 8:3.
148
Petrini, 2016 WL 6659149, at *4, *9.
149
Medical Marijuana Update: Caye v. Thyssenkrupp Elevator, supra note 14.
150
Abbott, supra note 12, at 6.
151
Id. at 7.
152
Id.
153
Caye v. Thyssenkrupp Elevator, 6296 CRB-1-18-11, 2019 WL 6168483, at *1 (Conn. Workers’
Comp. Comm’n Rev. Dev. Oct. 29, 2019) (citations omitted).
154
Id.
146
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statute, since doing so would put the insurer at risk of being prosecuted.155
The claimant, on the other hand, argued that PUMA and the CSA “are not
inherently incompatible and that recent federal legislative activity evinces a
clear public policy against enforcing the CSA against state medical marijuana
programs.”156 The claimant additionally argued that “[c]onsequently, it is
implausible for the respondents to assert a credible concern as to being
prosecuted should they comply with the commissioner’s finding.”157
The CRB held that the insurer must reimburse the claimant’s
expenditures for medical cannabis but vacated the order requiring the insurer
to pay directly for the medical cannabis.158 Thus, the CRB differentiated
between mandating the respondent to reimburse out-of-pocket expenses and
direct payment for the medical cannabis. As the dissent explained, the CRB
vacated the trial court’s order requiring respondent to make direct payment
to the dispensary because “[t]he respondent simply cannot comply with such
an order without violating federal law.”159 “The respondent would not only
be aiding and abetting the illegal transaction, it could be argued to have
induced or procured [the cannabis’s] commission.”160 Nonetheless, the CRB
affirmed the finding that the insurer should reimburse the claimant for the
out-of-pocket expenses partly because the CRB “determine[d] [that] the
respondents would not face a material risk of federal prosecution for
after-the-fact reimbursement of the claimant’s medical marijuana expense.”161
IV. SUPPORTING CASE LAW FOR REIMBURSEMENT
As of December 2021, the CRB holding in Caye is the precedent-setting
opinion in Connecticut as to whether respondents are required to pay for a
claimant’s out of pocket costs for medical cannabis.162 This Note argues that
when the issue of workers’ compensation coverage for medical cannabis is
inevitably appealed to the CT Appellate or Supreme Court, the reviewing
court should find that a workers’ compensation respondent should be
required to reimburse the cost of medical cannabis. The CT Appellate or
Supreme Court could easily rely on the reasoning established in both Petrini
and Caye in order to make this finding. The reviewing court can also find
support to side with workers in the holdings of CT Superior Court case,

155
Id. at *4 (arguing “that the CSA makes it illegal to finance a marijuana transaction and, were
they to do so, they could be prosecuted under that statute as well as the federal Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq. (RICO)”).
156
Id. at *1.
157
Id.
158
Id. at *10–11; CARTER ET AL., supra note 126, § 8:3.
159
Caye, 2019 WL 6168483, at *13 (Schoolcraft, Comm’r, dissenting).
160
Id.
161
Id. at *1 (majority opinion).
162
Assuming, of course, the prescription was found reasonable or necessary.
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163

Smith v. Jensen Fabricating Engineers; CT District Court case, Noffsinger
v. SSC Niantic Operating Co.;164 as well as out-of-state cases.
Before outlining the various court holdings below, however, it is
necessary to establish the standard that the CT Appellate Court uses to
review CRB decisions. First, “any party ‘aggrieved’ by the CRB decision
may take an appeal to the [CT] Appellate Court.”165 Accordingly, “[i]n any
workers’ compensation claim in Connecticut, there is an appeal of right to
the Appellate Court; [however] there is no appeal of right . . . from a decision
of the Appellate Court to the Supreme Court.”166 Nonetheless, the CT
Supreme Court may still review the CRB’s decision due to its “power to
review petitions for certification to the Supreme Court.”167
The Appellate Court reviews CRB decisions under a somewhat
deferential standard.168 Specifically, the standard of review by the Appellate
Court of the CRB is limited and the role of the court is to “determine whether
the review [board’s] decision results from an incorrect application of the law
to the subordinate facts or from an inference illegally or unreasonably
drawn.”169 In other words, when a trial commissioner and the reviewing
CRB sided with the claimant in Caye, Connecticut workers who seek
medical cannabis won a significant battle. Still, because this issue would be
one of first impression, and would be a “pure question[] of law,” the CT
Appellate Court would “invoke a broader standard of review than is
ordinarily involved.”170 Thus, it is important that the Appellate Court have
strong legal reasoning to uphold Caye’s basic holding.171
A. Caye v. Thyssenkrupp Elevator: Responding to Bourgoin v. Twin
Rivers Paper Co.
The CT Appellate or Supreme Court can and should rely on much of the
legal reasoning set forth by the CRB in the Caye decision. First, the CRB
majority opinion makes a compelling argument that in the event the CT
Workers’ Compensation Commission orders a respondent to reimburse a
claimant for medical cannabis and the respondent fails to do so, the
respondent could be subject to monetary sanctions pursuant to Connecticut
163
Smith v. Jensen Fabricating Eng’rs, Inc., No. HHDCV186086419, 2019 WL 1569048 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Mar. 4, 2019).
164
Noffsinger v. SSC Niantic Operating Co., 273 F. Supp. 3d 326 (D. Conn. 2017).
165
CARTER ET AL. , supra note 126, § 23:1 (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31–301b (2020)).
166
Id. § 23:11.
167
Id.
168
Id. § 23:1 (“On appeal the standard of review by the Appellate and Supreme Court of decisions
of the Compensation Review Board is . . . ‘limited’ . . . .” (citation omitted)).
169
Id. (citing Wiblyi v. McDonald’s Corp., 144 A.3d 1075, 1081 (Conn. App. Ct. 2016)).
170
Wiblyi, 144 A.3d at 1080 (“We have determined, therefore, that the traditional deference accorded
to an agency’s interpretation of a statutory term is unwarranted when the construction of a statute . . . has
not previously been subjected to judicial scrutiny . . . .” (alterations in original) (citation omitted)).
171
See Caye v. Thyssenkrupp Elevator, No. 6296 CRB-1-18-11, 2019 WL 6168483, at *1 (Conn.
Workers’ Comp. Comm’n Rev. Div. Oct. 29, 2019) (holding that the insurer must reimburse the
claimant’s expenditures for medical cannabis).
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Thus, the penalties associated

would negate the mens rea of willfulness necessary to sustain
a criminal prosecution for “aiding or abetting” a criminal act
pursuant to the CSA . . . because an employer or insurer
reimbursing a claimant for medical marijuana prescriptions
clearly would not be acting volitionally, but under an order
from a state agency exercising its statutory police powers and
empowered to sanction noncompliance.173
This argument set forth by the CRB is in direct response to the Maine
Supreme Court’s finding in Bourgoin v. Twin Rivers Paper Co. regarding
the crime of aiding and abetting.174 The Maine Supreme Court majority and
dissenting judges both agreed that the crime of aiding and abetting is a
specific intent crime.175 However, the Bourgoin majority reasoned that “‘for
purposes of aiding and abetting law, a person who actively participates in a
criminal scheme knowing its extent and character intends that scheme’s
commission,’ and, on that basis, is criminally liable.”176 Therefore, the
majority found that the employer would be “aiding and abetting [the
claimant]—in his purchase, possession, and use of marijuana—by acting with
knowledge that it was subsidizing [the claimant’s] purchase of marijuana.”177
The dissenting judge in Bourgoin, however, found that “the government
would not be able to prove that the employer would be acting with the
specific intent necessary to establish the requisite mens rea element of the
offense of aiding and abetting.”178 The dissenting judge cited to Judge
Learned Hand, who established
a definition of the necessary mens rea for all aiding and
abetting offenses, stating that in order to be guilty . . . , it is
necessary that the alleged aider or abettor “participate in [the
venture] as in something that he wishes to bring about, that he
seek by his actions to make it succeed.”179
Thus, as the Caye majority argued, the respondent would not be
reimbursing the claimant wishing to subsidize the medical cannabis. Instead,
the respondent-employer would be reimbursing the cost associated with the
medical cannabis after the fact because of a workers’ compensation

172

Id. at *9; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-288(a) (2020).
Caye, 2019 WL 6168483, at *9.
174
Bourgoin v. Twin Rivers Paper Co., 187 A.3d 10, 17 (Me. 2018).
175
Id. at 17; id. at 26 (Jabar, J., dissenting).
176
Id. at 17 (majority opinion) (citing Rosemond v. United States, 572 U.S. 65, 77 (2014))
(emphasis omitted).
177
Id. at 19 (emphasis added).
178
Id. at 25 (Jabar, J., dissenting).
179
Id. (citing United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1938)).
173
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commissioner’s order to do so and under the loom of monetary sanction if
they do not comply with the order.180
Second, the CT Appellate or Supreme Court can and should rely on the
CRB’s reasoning in Caye regarding preemption. The CRB found that the
issue presented was one of conflict preemption.181 The CRB ruling,
alongside the dissent in the Maine Supreme Court’s holding in Bourgoin,
found that nothing in the order to reimburse the cost of medical cannabis
required the appellant to physically possess or distribute cannabis, “which
would run afoul” of the CSA.182 The CRB reasoned that the employer’s
reimbursement of medical cannabis does not fall into any category of
defined or proscribed activity under the CSA and “[b]ecause the employer
is not required to physically engage in activity that the CSA proscribes, there
is no positive conflict in this case.”183 The CRB, again, mimicking
Bourgoin’s dissent:
found that reimbursement of expenses for marijuana, in
contrast to physical possession of marijuana, were materially
distinct types of transactions relative to liability under the
CSA. . . . [and] retrospectively making a claimant whole does
not constitute the level of involvement which would place the
respondent within the ambit of physically conducting a
proscribed transaction under the CSA.184
The CRB further argued that the respondent’s fear of federal prosecution
for compliance with a lawful order of the commission is particularly
theoretical “in a circumstance in which the respondent never violates the
CSA by actually possessing marijuana or engaging prospectively in a
marijuana transaction.”185 The CRB stated that, “[i]nstead, . . . the
respondent would be solely acting under their obligations . . . to make the
claimant whole.”186
Third, the uncertain but still persuasive argument that the CRB made in
Caye was the larger finding that the appellant’s fear of federal prosecution

180
Caye v. Thyssenkrupp Elevator, No. 6296 CRB-1-18-11, 2019 WL 6168483, at *9 (Conn.
Workers’ Comp. Comm’n Rev. Div. Oct. 29, 2019). See Bourgoin, 187 A.3d at 27 (Jabar, J., dissenting)
(“Contrary to the Court’s conclusion, I do not agree that mere knowledge constitutes active participation
in the commission of a crime, the effective accomplishment of which the accomplice himself or herself
must wish or desire to bring about in order to establish the requisite specific intent that the offense of
aiding and abetting demands.”).
181
Caye, 2019 WL 6168483, at *5.
182
Id. at *7; 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (2018). See Bourgoin, 187 A.3d at 24 (“[R]eimbursement does not
require the employer to physically manufacture, distribute, dispense, or possess marijuana, and, as a
result, no physical impossibility exists between the federal law and the [Workers’ Compensation Board]
order in this case.”).
183
Caye, 2019 WL 6168483, at *7 (citing Bourgoin, 187 A.3d at 25).
184
Id. at *9.
185
Id.
186
Id.
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was “speculative at best.” The CRB noted that for several years, Congress
has “pass[ed] legislative measures such as the Rohrabacher-Blumenauer
Amendment on an annual basis.”188 The CRB reasoned that there is no
indication that Congress is likely to stop passing such legislative measures
and “while there was some speculation that former Attorney General Jeff
Sessions might institute litigation or prosecutions . . . , to date this has not
occurred, and there has been no indication that the DOJ under [AG] William
Barr will do so.”189 This argument is uncertain because, as the Caye majority
recognized, Congress could stop passing stopgap legal protections, and the
current or future AG could direct the DOJ to commence prosecutions.190
The CRB majority deals with this uncertainty by relying on the
precedent set out in Gill v. Brescome Barton, Inc., finding that “respondents
can present evidence of changed legal circumstances since the issuance of
the commissioner’s findings and seek modification of the finding pursuant
to General Statutes § 31-315.”191 As the dissenting Commissioner in Caye
noted, however, there are flaws with this argument. Namely, “criminal
prosecutions are invariably brought for offenses that have already occurred.
If the actions we force the respondent to take today are currently illegal, the
fact they were committed before the government decided to resume
prosecuting such offenses will be no defense.”192 Still, the CRB majority
weighs the future concerns of respondents against the claimant’s current
situation, arguing that:
187

as of today, [the claimant] requires pain medication, and all
the medical experts on the record concur that the use of
marijuana for this purpose is reasonable and necessary. On the
other hand, the respondents . . . face only a speculative threat
of legal liability and, as we held [previously], we cannot offer
relief today in regards to a speculative, unripe dispute which
may occur in the future.193
The CT Appellate or Supreme Court should similarly weigh these
competing concerns and find that the current need for an injured worker to
use prescribed, reasonable, and necessary medication outweighs the
respondent’s theoretical concern of future prosecution.
187

Id.
Id. at *10. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, H.R. 133, 116th Cong. § 531 (2020)
(showing how the Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment was again reenacted).
189
Caye, 2019 WL 6168483, at *10.
190
Id.
191
Id. (citing Gill v. Brescome Barton, Inc., 5659 CRB-8-11-6 (June 1, 2012), aff’d, 68 A.3d 88
(Conn. App. Ct. 2013), aff’d, 114 A.3d 1210 (Conn. 2015)).
192
Id. at *15 (Schoolcraft, Comm’r, dissenting) (discussing another flaw, namely that “the
respondent would need the permission of a commissioner to stop paying. The notion that the respondent
should have to petition a commissioner for permission to stop doing something for which it is facing
criminal prosecution is, I have to believe, unprecedented.”).
193
Id. at *10 (majority opinion) (citing Meloni v. Raymark Indus., Inc., No. 5838 CRB-4-13-5,
2017 WL 2664894, at *1 (Conn. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n Rev. Div. June 1, 2017)).
188
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B. Petrini v. Marcus Dairy, Inc.: Medical Cannabis is Medically
Reasonable and Necessary
The CT Appellate or Supreme Court should also look to the CRB’s
opinion in Petrini for three reasons. First, Petrini was the first case to
establish that medical cannabis is a reasonable and necessary medication.194
Although this seems like an irrelevant holding, especially since the parties
in Caye stipulated to this fact,195 the CT Appellate Court has not yet
addressed this issue. Accordingly, the CT Appellate or Supreme Court will
still likely rely on the Petrini opinion regarding the preliminary question of
whether medical cannabis is a reasonable or necessary medication. The
respondent-employer could argue that the CT Appellate or Supreme Court
should not follow the CRB’s holding in Petrini, and instead should find that
medical cannabis is not a necessary treatment since there are federally legal
alternatives. In response, the claimant may be able to demonstrate that
medical cannabis treatment is both reasonable and necessary, however, the
statutory standard laid out in Connecticut General Statute § 31-294d(a)(1),
requires only that the claimant show that the treatment is reasonable or
necessary.196 The claimant will most likely have no problem demonstrating
that medical cannabis is reasonable, especially given the evidence that
cannabis is far less addictive and deadly than opioids.197
In resolving this possible dispute, the reviewing court should look to
the CRB’s holding in Lionetti v. Messineo, finding that § 31-294d(a)(1) only
requires the recommended treatment to be reasonable or necessary.198 In
Lionetti, the CRB reversed the trial commissioner’s decision denying
authorization for a surgery on the basis that the surgery was reasonable but
not necessary.199 The CRB acknowledged that there were numerous prior
cases where the CRB used
the phrase “reasonable and necessary” . . . interchangeably
with the phrase “reasonable or necessary,” and the findings of
the commissioner on the issue of medical care in those cases
were ultimately upheld. However, . . . . [the CRB was] not
aware of[] any prior cases in which th[e] board sustained either
a denial of or authorization for surgery which was deemed
reasonable but not necessary, or vice versa.200
194
Petrini v. Marcus Dairy, Inc., No. 6021 CRB-7-15-7, 2016 WL 6659149, at *1, *4, *5 (Conn.
Workers’ Comp. Comm’n Rev. Div. May 12, 2016).
195
Caye, 2019 WL 6168483, at *12 (Schoolcraft, Comm’r, dissenting).
196
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-294d(a)(1) (2020).
197
Boehnke et al., supra note 9, at 739.
198
Lionetti v. Paul G. Messineo, L.L.C., No. 6207 CRB-7-17-7, 2019 WL 3934753, at *9 (Conn.
Workers’ Comp. Comm’n Rev. Div. June 7, 2019).
199
Id. (“Given that the commissioner specifically concluded that [the recommended operation] was
reasonable, and therefore satisfied the requirements of § 31-294d(a)(1), we are unable to sustain the
commissioner’s decision to deny the surgery.”).
200
Id.
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Second, the CRB in Petrini also stated that, although PUMA specifically
excluded health insurance coverage for medical cannabis, the statute was
silent with respect to workers’ compensation insurance.201 The CRB
emphasized that a workers’ compensation insurance exclusion was absent
from PUMA at the outset of its analysis, but the purpose of doing so was to
establish subject matter jurisdiction.202 Nonetheless, the CT Appellate or
Supreme Court should similarly call attention to PUMA’s language as the
CRB did in Petrini. As this Note will argue below, the reviewing court
should, as other state courts have, weigh the absence of a workers’
compensation exemption from PUMA in its analysis of whether workers’
compensation insurers can be ordered to pay the out of pocket expenses for
medical cannabis.203
Lastly, the CT Appellate or Supreme Court should further consider that
many injured workers seek medical cannabis as an alternative to opioid
prescriptions, as demonstrated by the fact-pattern in Petrini.204 As detailed
above, Mr. Petrini took a large number of narcotic medications for six years
without significant pain relief and developed a number of unhealthy side
effects.205 Thankfully, Connecticut’s medical cannabis law allowed Mr.
Petrini to locate a physician to prescribe him medical cannabis, after which
he obtained so much relief that he rarely used any narcotics.206 Again, after
observing the results, his treating physician for his work-related injury stated
that “there should be no question of the medical necessity in substituting
medical marijuana for opiate medications.”207 Accordingly, the courts
should weigh the speculative chance of future prosecution against the public
interest in increasing access to a less deadly pain relief medication for
injured workers like Mr. Petrini.

201
Petrini v. Marcus Dairy, Inc., No. 6021 CRB-7-15-7, 2016 WL 6659149, at *5 (Conn. Workers’
Comp. Comm’n Rev. Div. May 12, 2016); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 21a-408o (2020).
202
Petrini, 2016 WL 6659149, at *5 (“We also note that while the legislation specifically excludes
health insurance coverage . . . , the statute is silent with respect to workers’ compensation insurance.
Thus, although neither of the parties . . . challenged the subject matter jurisdiction of this Commission,
we deem it worthy of mention that the enabling legislation does not appear to deprive this agency of the
jurisdiction to hear the matter.”) (citation omitted).
203
Id. But see Caye v. Thyssenkrupp Elevator, No. 6296 CRB-1-18-11, 2019 WL 6168483, at *17
(Conn. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n Rev. Div. Oct. 29, 2019) (Schoolcraft, Comm’r, dissenting) (arguing
that the “legislature expressly provided that health insurance companies cannot be forced to pay for
marijuana products;” that “there is no logical distinction to be drawn between a health insurer and a
workers’ compensation insurer;” and that “the majority’s position that the fact the legislature only
referred to health insurers in this caveat was an invitation for [the CRB] to order workers’ compensation
insurers to pay for marijuana”).
204
See Petrini, 2016 WL 6659149, at *1–2 (detailing the claimant’s medication history and showing
that the claimant rarely used any of his narcotic medication after he started taking medical cannabis).
205
Id. at *1.
206
Id. at *2.
207
Id. (internal quotations marks and citation omitted).
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C. Noffsinger & Jensen: PUMA’s Anti-Discrimination Provision and
Preemption
The CT Appellate or Supreme Court can further rely on the CT federal
district court case, Noffsinger v. SSC Niantic Operating Co.208 The plaintiff
in this case brought an employment discrimination suit against her
prospective employer alleging denial of employment based on a positive
cannabis pre-employment screening test in violation of PUMA’s
anti-discrimination provision.209 In response, the defendant argued that
PUMA is preempted by the CSA.210 The U.S. Connecticut District Court
held that “as a matter of first impression, CSA does not preempt” PUMA’s
anti-discrimination provision.211
The district court reasoned that “[g]iven that the CSA nowhere prohibits
employers from hiring applicants who may be engaged in illegal drug use,
defendant has not established the sort of ‘positive conflict’ . . . that is
required for preemption under the very terms of the CSA.”212 The district
court did note that unlike most cases “dealing with the CSA’s preemption of
state medical marijuana statutes,” PUMA contained a specific
anti-discrimination provision.213 Nonetheless, in the workers’ compensation
context, the reviewing court could similarly find that nowhere in the CSA
does it explicitly prohibit workers’ compensation respondents from
reimbursing claimants for the cost of an illegal drug.
Additionally, a reviewing court can also look to the Connecticut
Superior Court’s holding in Smith v. Jensen Fabricating Engineers, Inc.214
Although this is an unpublished opinion, the CRB in Caye noted this recent
superior court case, which also addressed PUMA’s anti-discrimination
provision.215 The superior court, like the district court in Noffsinger, found
the employer failed to establish the required “direct and positive conflict”
between PUMA and the CSA because the CSA does not criminalize the
employment of cannabis users and because the employer “is not required to
engage in any activity that [is] prohibited by the CSA.”216 The Jensen court
also reasoned that “[t]he mere fact of ‘tension’ between federal and state law
208
Noffsinger v. SSC Niantic Operating Co., 273 F. Supp. 3d 326 (D. Conn. 2017). See also
Noffsinger v. SSC Niantic Operating Co., 338 F. Supp. 3d 78, 79 (D. Conn. 2018) (further holding that
the “employer was not exempt from [the] PUMA anti-discrimination provision based on the federal Drug
Free Workplace Act”).
209
Noffsinger, 273 F. Supp. 3d at 331–32; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 21a-408p(b)(3) (2020) (“No
employer may refuse to hire a person or may discharge, penalize or threaten an employee solely on the
basis of such person’s or employee’s status as a qualifying patient . . . .”).
210
Noffsinger, 273 F. Supp. 3d at 333.
211
Id. at 326.
212
Id. at 336.
213
Id. at 335.
214
Smith v. Jensen Fabricating Eng’rs, Inc., No. HHDCV186086419, 2019 WL 1569048 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Mar. 4, 2019).
215
Caye v. Thyssenkrupp Elevator, No. 6296 CRB-1-18-11, 2019 WL 6168483, at *8 (Conn.
Workers’ Comp. Comm’n Rev. Div. Oct. 29, 2019) (citing Jensen, 2019 WL 1569048, at *1).
216
Jensen, 2019 WL 1569048, at *4.
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is generally not enough to establish an obstacle supporting preemption,
particularly when the state law involves the exercise of traditional police
power.”217 The CT Appellate or Supreme Court, in reviewing the preemption
issue in the workers’ compensation context, could take into consideration
Jensen’s point regarding traditional police powers, and by extension, the CT
Appellate or Supreme Court could reason, like in Caye, that
unless it is clear that the federal government has preempted a
state’s police powers, the state retains the ability to make its
own decisions as to how to best protect its own citizens . . . .
[I]n these circumstances, the federal government has essentially
decided to tolerate a certain level of tension between the CSA
and . . . state-authorized medical marijuana programs.218
Further, the court in Jensen noted that “federal preemption is
particularly weak where Congress has indicated its awareness of the
operation of state law . . . and has nonetheless decided to stand by both
concepts and to tolerate whatever tension there [is] between them.”219
Accordingly, the CT Appellate or Supreme Court can also reason that the
annual legislative action by Congress proscribing the use of federal funds to
prosecute anyone in compliance with state medical cannabis programs
provides evidence that Congress is aware of the operation of these medical
cannabis laws.
D. Out-of-State Case Law
As demonstrated above, the CT Appellate and Supreme Court has vast
legal standing within Connecticut jurisprudence to side with Connecticut
workers’ compensation claimants. Nonetheless, several state courts have
found that their cannabis laws were not preempted by the CSA,220 and in
addition to Connecticut’s CRB, at least four other state tribunals have found
that respondents were required to reimburse claimants for medical cannabis.221
217

Id. at *3 (quoting Madeira v. Affordable Hous. Found., Inc., 469 F.3d 219, 241 (2d Cir. 2006)).
Caye, 2019 WL 6168483, at *6.
219
Jensen, 2019 WL 1569048, at *3 (alterations in original) (citation omitted). See Caye, 2019 WL
6168483, at *8 (“Judge Budzik, [in Jensen], found that the CSA did not criminalize the employment of
marijuana users. He also noted that Congress was aware of state medical marijuana programs and had
acted to allow them to continue. Since the employer was not required to engage in any conduct that was
prohibited under the CSA, there was no obstacle preemption present.”).
220
See Conley & Markowitz, supra note 39, at 48 (discussing Arizona, California, and Michigan
court cases holding that “the laws decriminalizing medical marijuana did not pose an obstacle to the
federal enforcement of federal law,” and, thus, state law was not preempted by the CSA).
221
See Caye, 2019 WL 6168483, at *10–11 (ordering the respondent to reimburse the claimant’s
cost associated with his medical cannabis prescription); Vialpando v. Ben’s Auto. Servs., 331 P.3d 975,
980 (N.M. Ct. App. 2014) (holding that the New Mexico Workers’ Compensation Administration can
require employers and insurers to reimburse claimants for medical cannabis); Appeal of Panaggio, N.H.
Comp. Appeals Bd., 260 A.3d 825, 833 (N.H. 2021) (holding that “there is no direct conflict between
the CSA and a Board order to reimburse Panaggio for his medical marijuana purchase”); Hager v. M&K
Const., 225 A.3d 137, 140 (N.J. 2020) (holding that there is “no conflict between the CSA and MMA
218
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First, in Vialpando v. Ben’s Automotive Services, the New Mexico Court
of Appeals “held that the workers’ compensation act, properly interpreted,
permits reimbursement of medical cannabis to treat workplace injuries.”222
The court read the New Mexico’s Workers’ Compensation Act as consistent
with New Mexico’s “medical cannabis act to find that cannabis could be a
‘service’ for which reimbursement is provided under the program.”223 “The
court upheld the clear public policy favoring medical cannabis under state
law and declined ‘to reverse the order on the basis of federal law or public
policy.’”224 A year later, in Lewis v. American General Media, the Court of
Appeals of New Mexico reaffirmed its commitment to medical cannabis.225
The appellate court reasoned that respondent’s fear of federal liability is only
speculative in view of “existing Department of Justice and federal policy,”
referencing the Cole Memorandum and the Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment.226
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire in the Appeal of Panaggio held
that under both “impossibility preemption” and “conflict preemption,”
“there is no direct conflict between the CSA and a Board order to reimburse
Panaggio for his medical marijuana purchase.”227 Under the “impossibility
preemption” doctrine, the court reasoned that “[t]he CSA does not
criminalize the act of insurance reimbursement for an employee’s purchase
of medical marijuana.228
The insurer argued that “requiring it to reimburse Panaggio for the
purchase of medical marijuana ‘would invoke conduct that violates federal
law’ because it constitutes aiding and abetting his criminal activity.”229 The
plaintiff, in response, argued that “[b]ecause New Hampshire law
unambiguously requires the insurer to pay for the claimant’s medically
related treatment,’ an insurer that reimburses a claimant for the purchase of
medical marijuana acts without the volition required by the federal aiding
and abetting statute.”230 The court sided with the plaintiff and “agree[d] with
the reasoning of the dissenting justices in Bourgoin and with the New Jersey
Superior Court Appellate Division in Hager and conclude[d] that the insurer
[New Jersey’s medical marijuana law] [and] M&K's [the respondent’s] compliance with the order [to
reimburse the claimant for medical cannabis] does not establish the specific intent element of an aiding
and abetting offense under federal law”); Matter of Quigley v. Village of E. Aurora, 193 A.D.3d 207,
212 (N.Y. App. Div. 2021) (“[A]s the carrier can comply with the state’s statutory scheme without
running afoul of federal law, we do not find any conflict between the Controlled Substances Act and
either the Compassionate Care Act or Workers’ Compensation Law § 13 (a) with regard to the carrier’s
obligation to reimburse claimant for his medical marihuana expenses. . . .”).
222
Francis J. Mootz III & Jason Horst, Cannabis and Insurance, 23 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 893,
914 (2019); Vialpando, 331 P.3d at 976.
223
Mootz III & Horst, supra note 222; Vialpando, 331 P.3d at 978–79.
224
Mootz III & Horst, supra note 222 (quoting Vialpando, 331 P.3d at 980).
225
Lewis v. Am. Gen. Media, 355 P.3d 850, 858 (N.M. Ct. App. 2015).
226
Id.
227
Appeal of Panaggio, N.H. Comp. Appeals Bd., 260 A.3d 825, 833 (N.H. 2021).
228
Id.
229
Id.
230
Id.
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in this case, if ordered to reimburse Panaggio’s purchase of medical
marijuana, would not be guilty of aiding and abetting Panaggio’s violation
of the CSA because the insurer would not be an active participant with
the mens rea required by Rosemond.”231
The court also concluded, “[f]or similar reasons . . . that . . . the insurer
would not be guilty of conspiring with Panaggio to commit an offense under
the CSA. . . . Conspiracy, similar to aiding and abetting, requires voluntary
participation. . . . As discussed, the insurer’s compliance with a court or
Board order to reimburse Panaggio for his medical marijuana purchase does
not constitute voluntary participation.”232 Moreover, the court determined
that the “high threshold’ for obstacle preemption is not met here,” reasoning
that “a Board order to reimburse Panaggio does not interfere with the federal
government’s ability to enforce the CSA.”233 Finally, the court further
reasoned that “the CSA does not make it illegal for an insurer to reimburse
an employee for his or her purchase of medical marijuana [and it] does not
purport to regulate insurance practices in any manner.”234
A New York appellate court similarly was unpersuaded “by the employer
and the carrier’s claim that compelling the carrier to ‘fund’ claimant’s use of
medical marihuana under the [state medical cannabis statute] exposes it to
civil and criminal liability under the auspices of ‘conspiracy or aiding or
abetting.’ Importantly, ‘[t]he existence of a hypothetical or potential conflict
is insufficient to warrant the preemption of [a] state statute’ . . . .” 235 The
court further reasoned that even if the claimant’s procurement and
possession of medical cannabis under the NY medical cannabis statute is
illegal under the CSA, “any such criminal transaction in this regard is
necessarily completed prior to any request being made for reimbursement
from the carrier; thus, as ‘one cannot aid and abet a completed crime,’ under
such circumstances, the carrier cannot be said to be aiding and abetting a
crime and/or engaging in a conspiracy to commit same . . . .” 236
Other states, in determining questions of workers’ compensation
coverage for medical cannabis, relied on whether their medical cannabis
statutes explicitly mention insurance coverage.237 For example, in Hall v.
231

Id. at 835.
Id.
Id. at 837.
234
Id.
235
Matter of Quigley v. Village of E. Aurora, 193 A.D.3d 207, 212 (N.Y. App. Div. 2021)
236
Id.
237
See, e.g., Appeal of Panaggio, 205 A.3d 1099, 1102–03 (N.H., 2019) (decision reached on appeal
by Appeal of Panaggio N.H. Comp. Appeals Bd., 260 A.3d 825 (N.H. 2021) (court found that “[a]lthough
the statute does not create a right to reimbursement for the cost of medical marijuana . . . neither does it
bar any of those entities from providing reimbursement.” Instead, the Court provided that “a qualifying
patient shall not be . . . denied any right or privilege for the therapeutic use of cannabis,” and thus,
barring reimbursement would ignore this language. The Court reasoned that “statues in other jurisdictions
expressly prohibit workers’ compensation insurance carriers from reimbursing claimants for the cost of
medical marijuana . . . [and therefore], [h]ad the legislature intended to bar patients in the therapeutic
cannabis program from receiving reimbursement . . . it easily could have done so . . . .”); Caye v.
232
233
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Safelite Group, Inc., a Vermont court reasoned that the workers’
compensation commission could not order the respondent to reimburse for
medical cannabis by distinguishing Petrini and Connecticut’s medical
cannabis statute.238 Unlike PUMA, Vermont’s medical cannabis statute
explicitly states that workers’ compensation insurers are not responsible for
coverage.239 Thus, the CT Appellate or Supreme Court should similarly
consider the statutory language set forth in PUMA, noting the absence of a
workers’ compensation exemption despite its explicit exemption of health
insurance. Further, the reviewing Connecticut court should take into
consideration that several other states’ statutes expressly mention workers’
compensation insurers, where some states do not obligate workers’
compensation carriers to reimburse claimants and other’s explicitly do not
permit workers’ compensation carriers to reimburse claimants.240 The
Connecticut legislature, on the other hand, did not explicitly include
workers’ compensation carriers when drafting PUMA in 2012, nor has it
elected to amend PUMA in the past nearly ten years in order to include this
exemption. Accordingly, despite the dissenting Commissioner’s opposite
conclusion in Caye, “the fact the legislature only referred to health insurers
in this caveat was an invitation for [the Workers’ Compensation
Commission] to order . . . insurers to pay for [cannabis].”241
CONCLUSION
There is an unwritten rule among baseball fans that “the tie goes to the
runner,” even though a Major League Baseball umpire will tell you that there
Thyssenkrupp Elevator, No. 6296 CRB-1-18-11, 2019 WL 6168483, at *17 (Conn. Workers’ Comp.
Comm’n Rev. Div. Oct. 29, 2019) (Schoolcraft, Comm’r, dissenting) (explaining and disagreeing with
“the majority’s position that the fact the legislature only referred to health insurers in this caveat was an
invitation for us to order workers’ compensation insurers to pay for marijuana”); Hall v. Safelite Grp.,
Inc., No. 06-18WC, 2018 WL 1802814, at *11 (Vt. Dep’t Lab. & Indus. Mar. 28, 2018) (describing
medical cannabis statutes that have adopted provisions purporting to exempt private health insurers from
any obligation to pay for their use “as acknowledging the inconsistency between state and federal law”
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Jones v. Grace Healthcare Ctr., No. 03-025539MAM,
2019 WL 1594488, at *6 (Fla. Off. Judges Comp. Claims Apr. 9, 2019) (holding that, “based on the plain
language of [Florida’s medical cannabis statute], . . . a Florida workers’ compensation employer or carrier
cannot be required to pay for medical marijuana for an injured worker”).
238
Hall, 2018 WL 1802814, at *12.
239
Id.
240
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2814(A)(1) (2020) (“Nothing in this chapter requires . . .
a workers’ compensation carrier or self-insured employer [from] providing workers’ compensation
benefits to reimburse a person for costs associated with the medical use of marijuana.”); FLA. STAT. §
381.986(15)(f) (2020) (stating that “[m]arijuana . . . is not reimbursable under chapter 440,” Florida’s
workers’ compensation statute); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 418.315a (2020) (describing that “an employer is
not required to reimburse or cause to be reimbursed charges for medical marihuana treatment”). See also
John Howard, Steven Wurzelbacher, Jamie Osborne, Jennifer Wolf, John Ruser, and Raji Chadarevian,
Review of Cannabis Reimbursement by Workers’ Compensation Insurance in the U.S. and Canada, 1-13
AM. J. IND. MED. 1, 3–4 (2021) (reviewing state statutes that expressly prohibit workers’ compensation
carriers to reimburse medical cannabis and state statutes that make clear that workers’ compensation
insurers are not obligated to reimburse the costs of medical cannabis).
241
Caye, 2019 WL 6168483, at *17 (Schoolcraft, Comm’r, dissenting).
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is no such thing as a “tie” in baseball. The status of cannabis in the United
States is not so different—people purchase and business owners distribute
cannabis under this unwritten assumption that they will not face federal
prosecution under the CSA. Of course, as this Note has detailed, the federal
government has indicated through DOJ guidance memoranda and especially
through the passage of the Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment that the federal
government will not prosecute people and businesses who are complying
with their state’s cannabis laws. Nonetheless, there is no statute nor
regulation that explicitly states that if you follow your state’s cannabis laws,
you will not face prosecution for breaking federal law. Still, just like fans
continue to yell “the tie goes to the runner” despite knowing there is no
written rule that says so, cannabis users and business owners continue to
possess and distribute cannabis.
Across the United States, state courts and state administrative tribunals
have reached competing conclusions regarding reimbursement for medical
cannabis. Massachusetts, Maine, and Minnesota courts have concluded that
federal law preempts workers’ compensation courts from compelling
reimbursement for medical cannabis.243 Connecticut, New Hampshire, New
York, New Mexico, and New Jersey tribunals have reached the opposite
conclusion, compelling reimbursement.244 In other words, it is clear that
242

242
Mark Dewdney, “COME ON, BLUE: TIE GOES TO THE RUNNER!” No, It Does Not.,
BLEACHER REP. (July 27, 2009), https://bleacherreport.com/articles/225160-come-on-blue-tie-goes-tothe-runner-no-it-does-not.
243
See Wright v. Pioneer Valley, No. 04387-15, 2019 WL 3323160, at *8 (Mass. Dep’t Indus.
Accidents Feb. 14, 2019) (holding that “until marijuana is removed from Schedule I of the CSA . . . a
workers’ compensation insurer that is ordered to pay for an employee’s medical marijuana . . . would
risk prosecution for violating the CSA and the cited federal aiding and abetting law”); Bourgoin v. Twin
Rivers Paper Co., LLC, 187 A.3d 10, 17 (Me. 2018) (finding that an employer’s act of reimbursing an
employee’s acquisition of medical cannabis meets the elements of aiding and abetting as defined in
federal law); Musta v. Mendota Heights Dental Ctr., 965 N.W.2d 312, 316 (Minn. 2021) (concluding
“that the CSA preempts an order made under Minn. Stat. § 176.135, subd. 1, that obligates an employer
to reimburse an employee for the cost of medical cannabis because compliance with that order would
expose the employer to criminal liability under federal law for aiding and abetting Musta's unlawful
possession of cannabis”). Florida and North Dakota, by statute, have expressly prohibited the
reimbursement of medical cannabis. Howard et al., supra note 240, at 3. Ohio and Washington state
administrative rules dictate that medical cannabis is ineligible for reimbursement for workers’
compensation claimants because cannabis is not a FDA approved drug. Id. Other state statutes do not
require reimbursement, however, they do not expressly prohibit reimbursement. See id. at 3–4.
244
See cases cited supra note 221 (detailing case law in Connecticut, New Hampshire, New Mexico,
New Jersey, and New York where courts or workers’ compensation tribunals compelled respondents to
reimburse the cost of medical cannabis). In Delaware “[r]eimbursement for the cost of medical cannabis
for a workers’ compensation claim is not required and reimbursement depends on whether medical
cannabis treatment is ‘reasonable and necessary’ based on an ‘individualized inquiry.’” Howard, et al.,
supra note 240, at 4. Accordingly, based on this individualized inquiry, Delaware courts have differed
on their holdings regarding reimbursement. Compare Giles & Ransome v. Kalix, No. N17A-10-001
CEB, 2018 WL 4922911, at *4–5 (Del. Super. Ct. June 22, 2018) (affirming an award to an employee
requiring the insurer to reimburse the employer for the cost of medical cannabis treatment); with NoblesRoark v. Back Burner, No. N19A-11-001 ALR, 2020 Del. Super. LEXIS 386, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. July
28, 2020) (affirming the workers’ compensation review board’s decision denying claimant’s petition for
reimbursement for cannabis treatment because the review board was not precluded from finding that
claimant’s use of medical cannabis was not “reasonable or necessary”).
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legal minds can differ on the question of whether the CSA proscribes a state
agency from ordering an insurance carrier to reimburse for cannabis
prescriptions. Even within the Caye and Bourgoin opinions, the majority and
dissenting opinions presented extremely persuasive opposing arguments,
proving that among colleagues reviewing and discussing the same case, this
legal question is difficult to definitively answer.
Despite the legal haziness this question presents, or, more accurately,
that the CSA creates, the CT Appellate or Supreme Court should compel
respondents and their insurance carriers to reimburse the cost of medical
cannabis. In addition to the legal reasoning set forth in this Note, the public
interest of increasing access to alternative pain medication requires
consideration as well. Connecticut courts should pave the way for injured
workers to access medical cannabis given the available evidence that
medical cannabis is an effective and less addictive method of pain
management than opioids.245 Hopefully, employers and their workers’
compensation insurance carriers can help reduce the number of injured
workers who become addicted to opioids due to workplace injuries by
allowing injured workers to access a reasonable and necessary medication—
medical cannabis. When the issue presented in Caye is litigated in a future
case and reviewed by the CT Appellate or Supreme Court, Connecticut
workers deserve for this legal tie to go to the worker.

245

It is important to note that reimbursement for medical cannabis still prevents many workers from
accessing medical cannabis. Reimbursement requires workers to have the financial ability to pay for the
high cost of medical cannabis first and thereafter wait for reimbursement, which could take weeks or
months, especially if the respondent contests reimbursement. Accordingly, reimbursement as a solution
still limits workers, and in particular low-income workers, from accessing medical cannabis. Direct
payment for medical cannabis would solve this issue, however, as the Caye majority indicated, direct
payment may cause workers’ compensation respondents to engage in activity that is prohibited by the
CSA. See Caye, 2019 WL 6168483, at *10–11. This is why federal legislation allowing the use of medical
cannabis is crucial to ensuring better access to medical cannabis for all workers.

